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Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance
Stephanos Bibas∗
Prosecutorial discretion is a problem that most scholars attack from the
outside. What forces should constrain or guide prosecutors to pursue the right
numbers and types of cases, rank them well, treat them equally, behave ethically,
invest appropriate effort, and seek fitting punishments? Most scholars favor
external institutional solutions, such as ex ante legislation or ex post judicial and
bar review of individual cases of misconduct. As I have argued elsewhere, at best
these approaches can catch the very worst misconduct. They lack inside
information and sustained oversight and cannot generate and enforce fine-grained
rules to guide prosecutorial decision making.1
So what alternatives are there? There may be some underused external
regulatory strategies, such as legislative oversight hearings. But the most
promising alternatives work within prosecutors’ offices. Prosecutorial discretion
poses a principal-agent problem, which requires measures to align prosecutors’
incentives with voters’, victims’, and defendants’ interests. This is a two-step
process: first, head prosecutors must have incentives to serve their principals’
interests; second, head prosecutors must have tools to encourage their subordinates
to do the same. I have previously discussed the importance of victim oversight,
office culture, personnel practices, information sharing, and performance
evaluation in this process.2 In a series of works, Ronald Wright and Marc Miller
have examined prosecutorial self-regulation through internal office policies.3 In
this symposium, Ronald Wright considers how well prosecutorial elections may
discipline head prosecutors, aligning their self-interests in reelection with voters’
desires.4
Here I will explore another neglected toolbox that head prosecutors can use to
influence line prosecutors: compensation and other rewards. Rewards can both

∗ Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.A., Columbia; B.A., M.A., Oxford;
J.D., Yale. E-mail: stephanos *dot* bibas *at* gmail *dot* com. Thanks to Sara Beale and
participants in the Ohio State Criminal Justice Roundtable for their comments and suggestions.
1
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 959 (2009).
2
Id.
3
Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29,
61–66 (2003); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1031–34 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, Prosecutorial SelfRegulation]; Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 1087, 1093–97 (2005) [hereinafter Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines].
4
Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581 (2009).
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attract and retain the best candidates and also encourage those who are already
prosecutors to perform better.
We take it for granted that most prosecutors receive flat, lockstep annual
salaries tied to their years of seniority and experience, with civil-service
protections.5 Fixed, flat, seniority-based salaries have a few obvious bureaucratic
benefits. They are how most prosecutors have historically been paid,6 and for
lawyers the precedential force of past practice is huge. They are administratively
simple to administer, explain, and plan for in a budget. They avoid the need to
specify and weight various performance metrics and measures. They reduce the
hassle and frustration of haggling and the envious fear that someone else is getting
a better deal. And they seem to guarantee a kind of formal equality and neutrality,
preventing bias and favoritism in salary decisions.
Nevertheless, it is surprising that lockstep salaries have gone largely
unchallenged. Recent management literature has emphasized the need to pay for
performance, to attract and retain stars and to encourage quality performance and
hard work. It is time to apply these insights to improve prosecution.
This essay starts to think through how best to structure prosecutorial pay and
rewards. First, we need metrics of prosecutorial success to decide what traits and
behavior to reward. Part I discusses possible metrics. Historically, prosecutors
have focused on a few statistics such as conviction rates, but these numbers are
manipulable and incomplete. Prosecutors’ multiple constituencies and goals
require subtler measures. A better solution is to collect and aggregate feedback
from a variety of sources, including peer prosecutors, supervisors, judges, defense
counsel, victims, defendants, and the public. This information, appropriately
weighted and discounted, could better encourage prosecutors to serve all their
constituencies.
Once we have metrics of success, the next step is to devise incentives to
encourage success on these metrics. Part II surveys pay and reward systems
designed to attract and retain good prosecutors and to encourage them to succeed.
A first step is to offer variable salaries, raises, and promotions tied to the metrics of
success. (Prosecutors’ offices do some of this already, albeit informally and
haphazardly.)
More radical solutions could range from hourly rates to
performance-based bonuses to contingency fees. While some of the more radical
solutions, such as contingency fees, would be unwise or unworkable, other
solutions are worth trying.

5
Some may be part-time prosecutors, but increasingly most prosecutors are full-time
government employees. See STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2005, at 2–3 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (reporting
that almost 75% of head prosecutors, and 90% of all staff, were full-time; also reporting head
prosecutors’ annual salaries).
6
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
IN AMERICA 42–44 (2003) (reporting flat salaries paid to nineteenth-century Middlesex County,
Massachusetts prosecutors).
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I do not mean to suggest that prosecutors are money-grubbing materialists
who care only for the bottom line. If they were driven only by short-term
monetary considerations, most would have chosen more lucrative private-sector
options. Many public-spirited prosecutors want to do justice and serve as officers
of the court and also would like to gain trial experience and to feel the thrill of the
chase. Nevertheless, economic considerations cannot help but influence people, at
least at the margins. Prosecutors, like everyone else, have ordinary, human,
material desires as well as civic-minded zeal.
I. METRICS OF MERIT AND SUCCESS
Not all prosecutors are alike.
Some come from criminal-defense
backgrounds, which may reduce their temptation to prejudge guilt and blame.
Some come in with significant courtroom experience, while others require more
training. Some have stronger academic credentials, and some have stronger
research and writing backgrounds, than others. Some come from well-regarded
judicial clerkships or law firms that have already invested significant time in
training. Unsurprisingly, then, some job candidates have more appealing privatesector job offers than others. Of course government agencies are not about to
match private-sector salaries dollar for dollar. But to compete for the best talent,
one would expect prosecutors’ offices to adjust their offers to the market rate.
Likewise, prosecutors vary in their diligence, zeal, judgment, and experience.
A prosecutor who regularly burns the midnight oil deserves to be paid more than
one who leaves the office every day at 5 p.m. But lockstep raises leave the hard
worker feeling unappreciated and send the message to others that it does not matter
how hard you work. A prosecutor who shows excellent zeal, judgment,
persistence, and discretion is a bigger asset than one who violates ethical rules and
is too rigid or lackadaisical. But a lockstep salary system does nothing to
encourage the talented star to stay or the dud to leave. And a prosecutor who has
been in the office for a few years may have accumulated valuable wisdom, while
one who has stayed too long may have become jaded and tired.7 Yet seniority

7
George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110–19
(1975) (reporting empirical evidence that many prosecutors, particularly more experienced
prosecutors, manifest “conviction psychology” and presume guilt, and that this psychology “may
cause the prosecutor to ignore his quasi-judicial role”); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous
Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 206 (1988) (noting that “conviction
psychology” is a more powerful force than pressure to be fair); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial
Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 689–90 (noting that “conviction
psychology” makes it harder for prosecutors to protect innocent defendants); see Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 964 n.234 (1999) (quoting one former federal prosecutor as saying: “‘Career
prosecutors are inevitably cynical about the human race . . . . Someone who has been a defense
lawyer gets to see the person and is aware of the complexities and motivations, the ambiguities of
acts and sees things from a different tactical perspective.’”).
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raises automatically reward length of service instead of encouraging rotation in
office and regular infusions of fresh blood.
The criteria above apply equally to most public officials. Many other
problems are specific to prosecutors. The adversarial mindset tempts many
prosecutors to excessive partisanship. Prosecutors are public officials sworn to do
justice, not just convict, so we hold them to high ethical standards. Fighting hard
is part of zealous advocacy, but partisanship tempts them to go further and hit
below the belt.8 For example, the conviction mindset tempts some prosecutors to
overlook or withhold exculpatory or impeachment evidence. They may block
DNA testing or obstinately defend convictions even after DNA tests confirm
innocence.9 They may threaten excessive charges, lie, or misrepresent facts to
pressure or bluff defendants into plea bargains or cooperation deals. Prosecutors’
powers to subpoena, bring or dismiss charges, and strike deals are vast yet not
constrained.
How can head prosecutors measure merit and performance? They would have
to use a series of performance reviews. In many corporations, supervisors rate
their subordinates’ performance each year.10 One problem is that supervisory
prosecutors have only partial information about line prosecutors’ performance.
While some kinds of experience are evident from one’s résumé, it is harder to
measure investigation, research, writing, diligence, zeal, judgment, ethics, and
integrity. Putting all that power into a single pair of hands risks overemphasizing a
few highly visible metrics, such as conviction or case-processing rates or wins in a
few notable trials. It over-emphasizes trial performance at the expense of
prosecutors’ many lower-visibility responsibilities. Conversely, it may slight
softer, less visible goods such as fairness, ethics, professionalism, and courtesy.
Many other actors in the system also have relevant information about
prosecutors’ performance: judges, defense counsel, defendants, and victims all see
prosecutors in action. The ideal evaluation system would aggregate information
from these actors across hundreds of cases. Rather than assigning fixed weights to
performance criteria ex ante, it would let them bubble up from the shared sense of
the local criminal justice community. These ratings would assess and aggregate
zeal, investigation, research, rhetorical skill, professionalism, ethics, diligence,
courtesy, respect, and satisfaction across a range of cases. Collective evaluation
would thus be more subtle, reliable, and resistant to manipulation than a single
statistic. This idea parallels the management trend toward 360-degree feedback,
8

The Supreme Court put this point most famously in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935) (“[The prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”).
9
Adam Liptak, Prosecutors Fight DNA Use for Exoneration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at
A1.
10
See, e.g., JACK WELCH WITH JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 158–68
(2001) (describing General Electric’s system of annually rating the top 20%, middle 70%, and bottom
10% of employees, rewarding top performers generously to retain them, and getting rid of the bottom
ones).
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aggregating feedback from supervisors, subordinates, peers, customers, suppliers,
and even competitors.11
There is already some informal feedback, through the courthouse grapevine
and judges’ and defense counsel’s occasional comments to head prosecutors and
post-trial debriefings. Likewise, some local bar associations already question their
members to evaluate judicial performance.12 And some experiments with
community prosecution ask victims or community leaders to evaluate particular
prosecutors’ performances.13 But feedback is so important that it needs to be
continual, systematic, and comprehensive.
One possible model for these reviews would be eBay’s reputational feedback
system. Pollsters would work with prosecutors to develop short evaluation forms,
asking for quantitative and brief qualitative feedback on roughly ten dimensions.
The pollsters would then license their forms to prosecutors’ offices for a fee. Of
course, designing the right survey tool would take work, to make it detailed
enough to provide useful information yet brief enough that those surveyed would
respond.
Prosecutors’ offices would email these forms to victims and defendants right
after each case, and to judges, defense counsel, and police every few months.
Evaluators could also file follow-up reports to flag DNA or suppressed witness
evidence that comes to light years later. A web-based survey tool, such as
zoomerang.com or surveymonkey.com, could collect and tabulate responses
anonymously. A computer algorithm could weed out or discount outlier
responses.14 The survey and algorithm could evolve to reflect the combined
judgments and local intuitions of hundreds of dispersed actors.15
11
See generally THE HANDBOOK OF MULTISOURCE FEEDBACK (David W. Bracken, Carol W.
Timmreck, & Allan H. Church eds., 2001); MICHAEL ARMSTRONG, A HANDBOOK OF HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 521–29 (10th ed. 2006); PETER WARD, 360-DEGREE FEEDBACK
(1997).
12
See, e.g., Andrea R. Barter, Massachusetts Judges Receive Report Cards from MBA
Judicial Evaluation Participants, MASS. BAR ASS’N LAW. J., Dec. 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.massbar.org/for-attorneys/publications/lawyers-journal/2005/december/massachusetts-ju
dges-receive-report-cards; Corpus Christi Bar Association, 2005 Judicial Evaluation Poll, available
at http://www.ccbar.com/images/CCJEP2005.pdf.
13
M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove & Patricia N. Fanflik, Community Prosecution: Rhetoric or
Reality?, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 219–20 (John L. Worrall & M.
Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008). See also MICHAEL A. RAMOS, SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY DIST.
ATTY’S OFF., INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNITY PROSECUTION (2002), available at
http://www.sbcounty.gov/brochures/docs/95.pdf (reporting that “continuous evaluation” is a
component of San Bernardino County’s neighborhood prosecution).
14
eBay successfully uses such an algorithm to weight reputational feedback left by buyers
and sellers. For literature that discusses the value of online feedback and ways to counteract unfair
and discriminatory ratings, see, for example, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Building Trust Online: The
Design of Robust Reputation Reporting Mechanisms for Online Trading Communities, in SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA 95 (Georgios Doukidis et al. eds., 2004);
Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings
and Discriminatory Behavior, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC
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A supervisory prosecutor could also review the information with a critical
eye. If a defendant or defense lawyer said simply that the prosecutor was too
tough, without further explanation, the supervisory prosecutor would discount the
source. Discounting would prevent threats of low ratings from becoming
bargaining leverage or retaliation for appropriate toughness. (Algorithms likewise
could discount feedback from sources who themselves have low feedback scores,
who are outliers, or who complain about everyone.) If, on the other hand, defense
counsel or defendants alleged specific ethical violations, and these complaints
formed a pattern, supervisors would heed them. Even absent a pattern, a single
serious allegation could trigger an internal investigation; a routine feedback system
makes it easier to spot and probe these allegations. It can be hard to capture and
code some of the most egregious events, such as suppression of evidence, but even
a narrative alert would do much good. An imperfect effort to monitor misconduct
and create a feedback loop is much better than none at all.
One advantage of this aggregation of information is that it is more subtle than
traditional carrots and sticks. For example, judges can hold prosecutors in
contempt for lying, and bar authorities can disbar them for withholding
exculpatory evidence. In practice, however, contempt, disbarment, and suspension
are vanishingly rare.16 When judges or bar authorities find misconduct but refuse
to suspend or disbar, supervisors can still use this information in deciding whom to
reward and promote. Defense lawyers’ feedback is especially important. One
might fear that defense lawyers would simply reward leniency rather than
competency, but on the whole they respect and do not blame tough but fair
COMMERCE 150 (2000); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading
Environments with Pure Moral Hazard, 16 INFO. SYS. RES. 209 (2005); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The
Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 MGMT.
SCI. 1407 (2003); Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputation in an Internet Auction
Market, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 633 (2002).
15
For a fascinating proposal to develop such a system of traffic enforcement, in which norms
would emerge from the collective judgment of myriad drivers, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s
My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006).
16
One empirical study found that out of hundreds of cases of egregious misconduct over
nearly four decades, not a single prosecutor was disbarred or convicted of a crime. Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1; Ken Armstrong &
Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1. Another newspaper study
reviewed 1500 allegations of prosecutorial misconduct over a ten-year period. Though the study
turned up hundreds of discovery violations involving exculpatory or impeachment evidence,
“[p]rosecutors who violated discovery rules were seldom punished. Many violated discovery rules
over and over again.” Bill Moushey, Hiding the Facts: Discovery Violations Have Made EvidenceGathering a Shell Game, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A1. One recent exception,
notable for its rarity, is the disbarment of prosecutor Mike Nifong, who withheld exculpatory
evidence in prosecuting Duke lacrosse players for rape. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full
Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 257, 302–06 (2008) (discussing notorious
prosecutor of Duke lacrosse players, who was disbarred after extensive publicity surrounding deeply
flawed prosecution).
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prosecutors.17 While they do not always agree with prosecutors, they know best
what prosecutors are doing because they interact with them regularly. Supervisors
can discount obviously biased reviews while still heeding verifiable complaints.
Public defenders, in particular, already discuss and share prosecutors’ reputations
within their office and can formally pass these impressions on to head prosecutors.
And, as repeat players, they intuit violations of courthouse norms and are wellplaced to spot patterns and trends. Privately retained counsel do not stand in the
same position. On the other hand, many are former prosecutors who can compare
observed behavior with the office’s norms and ideals. Ex-prosecutors who
maintain good relations with their former offices are likely to have balanced
perspectives. Their complaints may thus be credible and weighty.
This information would be invaluable in setting raises. But it would also help
to catch prosecutors in need of additional training, discipline, or firing, much like
early-warning systems to catch police misconduct. In other words, management
would use this information tool to spot and fix problems, even apart from any link
to compensation. Monitoring also sends the message that performance matters and
that prosecutors must view judges, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and the
public as their constituents. Knowing that they were being evaluated, prosecutors
would strive to serve their constituencies better, much as salesmen and customerservice representatives do. Incentives, rather than rules, would guide prosecutorial
discretion.
Of course, evaluation and feedback systems are costly. Ratings take time, and
surveys and algorithms cost money. Busy lawyers and judges resent more
paperwork. On the other hand, judges and defense lawyers may welcome the
chance to improve the lawyering they face and be flattered that supervisory
prosecutors would listen. Victims and defendants may want to express their
thoughts and feelings, particularly when they are dissatisfied with a prosecutor’s
performance. Moreover, the costs of rating may well be worth it; at the very least,
they are worth trying out. Some of the most successful, profit-oriented companies,
such as General Electric, invest lots of time and money in feedback, and other
companies imitate their successes.18 Surely that success testifies to the usefulness
and value of the resulting feedback.

17

See, e.g., Ian Berry, Waltz Prosecutor Called Tough, But Fair, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS (Tenn.), Sept. 19, 2005, at B1; Dan Eggen, Second-in-Command at Justice to Depart: Comey
Led Drives on Terrorism, Fraud, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2005, at A21; Morning Edition: Senate Panel
Sets Deadline on Corruption Case (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 13, 2007); Kirk Makin, Morin
Informant Named Dangerous Offender, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 4, 2007, at A7; Shannon McCaffrey,
New No. 2 at Justice a ‘Class Act’ Known for Apolitical, Aggressive Style, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE
NEWS SERV., Dec. 12, 2003, at K1794 (noting that not only did defense lawyers praise James Comey
“as a tough but fair prosecutor’s prosecutor,” but even a mob assassin whom he was trying to
imprison slipped him a note at trial that read “‘You’re a class act . . . . No one deserves that [lawyerof-the-year] award more than you do’”).
18
WELCH, supra note 10.
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II. SALARIES, BONUSES, AND OTHER REWARDS
Once head prosecutors develop metrics of success and survey relevant
constituencies to evaluate prosecutors, they can use these data to set pay and nonmonetary rewards. More flexible pay scales might allow head prosecutors to
experiment to attract and retain top talent. For example, head prosecutors could
receive a fixed budget but have considerable freedom in deciding how to allocate
that budget. They could experiment with different schemes and see what works.
They could pay star hires more and offer merit raises to reward and keep good
talent. While one pool of money might fund cost-of-living raises for everyone, a
second pool could fund discretionary raises or bonuses tied to performance
reviews.19 Even if civil-service protections prevent cutting prosecutors’ salaries,
head prosecutors could at least have flexibility in deciding whether and how much
to increase them.
Top performers should receive rewards, which help to retain them and may
teach everyone about good prosecutorial performance. Performance reviews can
also help to weed out the weakest prosecutors. General Electric keeps improving
its workforce by laying off the bottom ten percent of its workforce each year.20 If
civil-service protections make it impossible to fire poor performers, they should at
least receive low salaries so that they leave on their own.21
Head prosecutors already do some of this through their promotions. Star
performers may get promoted to supervisory or other plum jobs, which may carry
more interesting work and higher salaries. This approach resembles Stephen Choi
and Mitu Gulati’s proposal for a tournament of judges, which would promote those
who are most successful based on objective criteria.22 Because current metrics are
crude and feedback incomplete, however, these promotions reward merit only
19

Firms prefer bonuses to raises, as the former reserve flexibility and keep pay tied to
continued performance. If one year’s star becomes next year’s slacker, he will continue to receive
any raises but need not get any bonuses. See Erin White, Employers Increasingly Favor Bonuses to
Raises: Companies Aim to Motivate Workers, Lower Fixed Costs; Losing ‘Entitlement’ Notion,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2006, at B3.
20
WELCH, supra note 10, at 158–67, 387–88 (“From my first days, I thought [ranking] was
the key to building a great organization. . . . We used it relentlessly to push leaders to continually
upgrade their teams. Year after year, forcing managers to weed out their worst performers was the
best antidote for bureaucracy.”).
21
See EDWARD E. LAWLER III, STRATEGIC PAY: ALIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES AND
PAY SYSTEMS 25 (1990) (noting that dissatisfaction with pay is a good way to encourage mediocre
employees to leave).
One might fear that the low performers will stay on yet be demoralized and perform poorly.
But that fear depends on the contradictory assumptions that the low performers could perform better
than they do if they were compensated more, yet that compensation incentives will not in fact
encourage them to perform better, and they would not leave their jobs despite such discontent. Poor
performers who do stay on, in other words, would likely be poor performers regardless of how one
paid them.
22
See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Essay, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299,
299 (2004).
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imperfectly. Moreover, there are only a handful of high-paying supervisory jobs in
any one office. A broader merit-pay scheme can reward and encourage many more
prosecutors. And if supervisors are staying in office too long, term limits and
salary caps can encourage turnover to make room for the next generation.
The business world uses many kinds of incentives beyond annual salaries.
Some companies pay employees by the hour or give hourly bonuses for hours
worked beyond some minimum. Some offer end-of-year bonuses, which may be
tied to meeting fixed performance goals. And lawyers sometimes work on
contingency fees, receiving extra rewards if they win.
The one law professor to write in this area has suggested using contingency
bonuses to discourage overcharging and charge bargaining. Tracey Meares
proposed that prosecutors receive financial bonuses for securing convictions on the
charges initially filed.23 These rewards could counteract prosecutors’ natural
incentive to overcharge and hoard plea-bargaining chips, only to trade them away
in exchange for plea agreements. She also proposed financial penalties for
prosecutorial misconduct.24 Though the idea makes sense in the abstract, it is
probably unworkable.
Sizable rewards could encourage prosecutors to
undercharge and to strike overly generous plea bargains to avoid allegations of
misconduct.25 This example illustrates a broader problem with incentive pay
schemes: they tend to rely on a few visible, objective, quantifiable statistics, at the
expense of softer values.26 Head prosecutors’ performance goals likewise tend to
depend on conviction statistics, which prosecutors can manipulate and inflate.27
These objections do not invalidate Meares’ idea, however; they simply require
using more subtle metrics, of the sort discussed in Part I.
The same set of issues would bedevil any efforts to pay prosecutors
contingency fees based on the outcome of particular cases. Rewarding prosecutors
for convictions but not acquittals would bias their roles as officers of the court
sworn to exonerate the innocent.28 Moreover, contingent fees give prosecutors too
23

Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–77 (1995).
24
Id. at 901–02.
25
Cf. id. at 884–87, 916–17 (noting these difficulties but suggesting that they are minor or
that other mechanisms could solve them).
26
Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B, in ORGANIZATIONAL
INFLUENCE PROCESSES 142, 148 (Lyman W. Porter et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); see also WELCH, supra
note 10, at 387 (noting that General Electric sales contest produced enormous sales but no profit
margin: “That’s the simplest example of a universal problem: What you measure is what you get—
what you reward is what you get.”).
27
Cf. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 167, 233 n.10 (1980) (noting that when incentive pay rewarded Washington, D.C.
police officers for reducing crime, officers manipulated statistics by misreporting burglaries as
larcenies or under-reporting the dollar values involved).
28
Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (holding that due process forbids quasijudicial officer from receiving monetary reward for conviction but not for acquittal).
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little incentive to distinguish among guilty defendants and to target only those
most deserving of punishment.29
One might object that monetary rewards commodify and thus cheapen
professional ethics and public interest. Monetary rewards might undercut the sense
of community spirit and professional responsibility that drives many prosecutors.30
But prosecuting is a paying job, not a family activity such as bearing and raising
children, nor the sale of body parts or sex. Moreover, paying for performance
sends a message recognizing and applauding ethical, dedicated work. It must be
done in the right measure, supplementing but not supplanting ethical exhortation.
In that way it is like gift-giving, an ancient practice in which the monetary value
underscores the non-monetary thanks and appreciation. (Few people would object
that a spouse’s valuable gifts commodify the marriage. And valuable gifts at
weddings, including money, signify friends’ and families’ love.) Failing to do so,
and treating duds equally, can just as easily be seen as indifference to whether or
not a prosecutor excels.
Another problem with monetary raises and bonuses is that most Americans
expect their employers to keep their salaries confidential. Publishing salaries risks
generating envy, particularly if salaries deviate from lockstep seniority raises.
Thus, raises cannot easily send public messages about which prosecutors to
emulate. There is no such expectation of secrecy for promotions and nonmonetary rewards, however. These other rewards can thus confer status and
prestige and teach lessons about how prosecutors should behave.
A reward can be as simple as a phone call. If a supervisor or judge telephones
a line prosecutor and says, “You’re doing a great job on X,” the prosecutor will
beam with pride. Conversely, every prosecutor dreads criticism from a supervisor
or judge for making a big mistake. More frequent compliments and suggestions,
with specific details, would cost nothing and greatly improve the feedback loop.
Another visible, cheap incentive involves giving awards and commendations.
Simply handing a prosecutor a plaque or trophy, and holding a small ceremony to
commemorate an important success, sends a message. Right now, these awards
tend to come after major convictions at trial, which are only a fraction of a
prosecutor’s job. They also tend to be given by law-enforcement agencies. But
coupled with evaluations and improved feedback, awards could easily recognize
other notable behavior on behalf of other constituencies. For example, rewarding

29

Nicholas Parrillo, The Rise of Non-Profit Government in America: An Overview and a
Case Study 43, 69–82, 110–36 (Jan. 20, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(discussing why states that used to pay prosecutors rewards for convictions moved away from that
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prosecutors for exonerating innocent convicts would underscore that the
prosecutor’s job is to do justice, not just secure convictions.
Even publishing statistics can recognize good performers and shame bad ones.
When courts circulate lists of how many pending cases each judge has outstanding,
judges hate to be on the slow end.31 The same is true of some professors’ concern
for their students’ course evaluations. Though life-tenured judges and tenured
professors face no tangible consequences for mediocre performance, their desire
for others’ esteem drives them to do better. Of course, publishing a single statistic
may overemphasize that goal at the expense of others, distorting performance. If
the only goal is to dispose of cases, then prosecutors will plea-bargain too cheaply
and not hang tough in cases that deserve to go to trial. But publishing an aggregate
performance evaluation, including its components, could make the metric more
reliable and less manipulable. Quite apart from their impact on promotions and
rewards, evaluations can drive prosecutors’ desire to do well in the eyes of others.
One can also play with more creative rewards. Imagine, for example, that the
hardest and best workers earn vacations. Some might receive paid vacation time.
Others could win free vacations to the Caribbean, especially if tour operators
donated free trips. This kind of tangible reward can recognize and help to retain
star performers as well as teach others whom and what to emulate.
III. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors are not simply economic animals. Most want to do the right
thing, to seek justice by convicting the guilty and freeing the innocent.
Nevertheless, they are human too, so incentives matter. Prosecutors’ offices first
need to figure out the metrics of success they want to encourage in order to combat
the sense that only conviction and case-processing rates matter. Doing so will also
make them more accountable. Setting metrics could be part of a public,
democratic dialogue, making prosecutors more responsive to the constituencies
they supposedly represent. Then, prosecutor’s offices need to tailor their salary
schemes, bonuses, raises, and non-monetary perks to these metrics. Prosecuting is
not a private business, but it can learn the best of what management experts have
learned from their own field.
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